Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.
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Introduction
Recently, many areas of public policy-from spectrum management to environmental policy-have benefited from the contributions of economists, particularly from the areas of game theory and mechanism design. In this study we argue that natural disaster reconstruction may greatly benefit as well from supplementing the toolbox of civil engineers with more economic reasoning. In particular, current reconstruction procedures after floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, or even limited wars could adopt decision mechanisms that are incentive compatible and that efficiently aggregate information.
The 1990s were the costliest decade on record in terms of disaster management due to seismic events, placing unprecedented pressure to improve on earthquake protection practices (Coburn and Spence 2002) . Our close studies of recent postearthquake recoveries demonstrate that the existing emergency responses present areas where their performance is not up to the task. One reason is that they have more of a combat control aspect to it and much less of an economic assessment character. The contribution of this paper is to point to possible ways to integrate economic incentives in a traditionally command-and-control activity such as emergency plans that cope with natural disasters. We propose to apply a specific decisional mechanism, borrowed from mechanism design theory, to ex post sequence repair works, and also discuss its limitations in managing recovery after a seismic event. Instead of considering all the many aspects of natural disaster prevention and recovery (Miletti 1999; Kreimer and Arnold 2000) , we focus attentionbecause of their clear social importance-on the restoration of those essential services known in the civil engineering literature as "lifelines": water, electric power, transportation, and telephone systems.
There is a sizable literature on assessment and coverage of earthquake risks (Kleffner and Doherty 1996; Froot 1999; Penalva 2002) , on preventive policies to mitigate the quake damage (Kunreuther and Kleffner 1992; Coburn and Spence 2002, chapters 3, 6, 8) , as well as on estimating the economic cost of earthquakes (FEMA 2000) . While building on these studies, we focus on the postearthquake recovery stage and show how current practices may benefit from incorporating more explicit financial incentives for the actors involved in restoring critical lifeline services. The perspective is the one of a planner that lacks all the relevant information to implement a plan and employs economic incentives to set priorities and gather the information from others. In this respect, the present study differs from the operational research literature (Bryson et al. 2002) .
Despite John Stuart Mill's comment about the resiliency of human nature, "the great rapidity with which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war" (Mill 1896), recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that rebuilding lifelines is a challenging task that leaves considerable room for improvement. Lack of coordination among lifeline firms, for instance, was a significant source of inefficiency (Section 2). After presenting
